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CLAIMS

- 1. A method of digital signing on a digital message, comprising:
 - (a) providing a communication channel,
 - (b) providing a system authority means **O** which governs a private key **Do** and a public key **Eo**,

where

Do: private key of said system authority means **O** consisting of **do** and **no** in accordance with the RSA cryptographic method described in U.S. patent 4,405,829

do: private exponent of said Do

Eo: public key of said system authority means O consisting of eo and no in accordance with the RSA cryptographic method

eo: public exponent of said Eo

no: modulus of the key pair **Do**, **Eo**,

- (c) providing at least one message sender means Z with an assigned ID # Nz,
- (d) providing at least one message receiver means Y,
- (e) said system authority means **O** providing **Cz** and said **Eo** to said **Z** and said **Eo** to said **Y**,

where

Cz: a secret key of said Z such that

$$Cz = Do \{Nz\}$$

= $Nz^{do} \pmod{no}$,

- { }: a cryptographic operation in accordance with the RSA cryptographic method,
- (f) said Z providing a digital message Mz and transforming said Mz into a signed message Sz and then sending said Nz, said Mz and said Sz to said Y via said communication channel,

where

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$$Sz = Mz \{Cz\}$$

$$= Cz^{Mz} \pmod{no},$$

(g) said Y receiving said Nz, said Mz and said Sz, and verifying said Sz by examining

Eo $\{Sz\}$ and Nz^{Mz} (mod no), where

 $Eo \{Sz\} = Sz^{eo} \pmod{no},$

whereby said message sender means **Z** can sign on said message **Mz** using less calculation than is necessary with the standard RSA cryptographic method, and said message receiver means **Y** can verify the genuineness of said signed message **Sz** without knowing said **Z**'s secret key **Cz**.

- A method according to Claim 1 wherein said message sender means Z's assigned ID # Nz includes information about its own expiration date, whereby said message receiver means Y can validate said assigned ID # Nz.
- 3. A method according to Claim 1 wherein said message sender means **Z** prepares pre-calculated tables of powers of said secret key **Cz**.
- 4. A method according to Claim 1 wherein said digital message Mz includes a hash value of information about an account balance.
- 5. A method according to Claim 1 wherein said digital message **Mz** includes information about the date of its own generation, whereby said digital message **Mz** is more difficult to duplicate.
- 6. A method of digital authentication, comprising:
 - (a) providing a communication channel,
 - (b) providing a system authority means O which governs a private key Do and a public key Eo,where

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Do: private key of said system authority means **O** consisting of **do** and **no** in accordance with the RSA cryptographic method described in U.S. patent 4,405,829

do: private exponent of said Do

Eo: public key of said system authority means O consisting of eo and no in accordance with the RSA cryptographic method

eo: public exponent of said Eo

no: modulus of the key pair Do, Eo,

- (c) providing at least one authenticator means Y,
- (d) providing at least one authenticate means Z with an assigned ID # Nz,
- (e) said system authority means **O** providing **Cz** and said **Eo** to said **Z** and said **Eo** to said **Y**,

where

Cz: a secret key of said Z such that

$$Cz = Do \{Nz\}$$

= $Nz^{do} \pmod{no}$,

- { }: a cryptographic operation in accordance with the RSA cryptographic method,
- (f) said Z sending said Nz to said Y and requesting to be authenticated,
- (g) said Y generating a challenge message Mz and sending it to said Z,
- (h) said **Z** receiving said **Mz**, transforming it into a signed message **Sz** and sending said **Sz** to said authenticator means **Y** via said communication channel, where

$$Sz = Mz \{Cz\}$$

$$= Cz^{Mz} \pmod{no}.$$

said Y receiving and verifying said Sz by examining Eo {Sz} and Nz^{Mz} (mod no),
 where

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 $Eo \{Sz\} = Sz^{eo} \pmod{no},$

whereby said authenticatee means **Z** can be authenticated using less calculation than is necessary with the standard RSA cryptographic method, and said authenticator means **Y** can verify the genuineness of said signed message **Sz** without knowing said **Z**'s secret key **Cz**.

- 7. A method according to Claim 6 wherein said message sender means Z's assigned ID # Nz includes information about its own expiration date, whereby said message receiver means Y can validate said Nz.
- 8. A method according to Claim 6 wherein said message sender means **Z** prepares pre-calculated tables of powers of said secret key **Cz**.
- A method according to Claim 6 wherein said challenge message Mz includes information about the date of its own generation, whereby said Mz is more difficult to duplicate.
- 10. An authentication device that is used in a digital communication system, where said digital communication system comprises:
 - (a) a communications channel,
 - (b) a system authority means **O** for providing **Cx** and **Eo** to any entity **X** in the system,

where

Cx: a secret key of said X such that

$$Cx = Do \{Nx\}$$
$$= Nx^{do} \pmod{no}$$

{ }: a cryptographic operation in accordance with the RSA cryptographic method described U.S. Patent 4,405,829

Nx: ID # assigned to said X

Do: private key of said system authority means **O** consisting of **do** and **no** in accordance with the RSA cryptographic method

do: private exponent of said Do

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Eo: public key of said system authority means O consisting of eo and no in accordance with the RSA cryptographic method

eo: public exponent of said Eo

no: modulus of the key pair Do, Eo,

- (c) at least one message sender means **Z** coupled to said communication channel,
- (d) at least one message receiver means Y coupled to said communication channel, and said authentication devices is adapted for receiving said Cx and said Eo from said system authority means O and for transforming a digital message M to a signed message S and for transmitting said S via said communication channel, where

$$S = M \{Cx\}$$
$$= Cx^{M} \pmod{no}.$$

11. A device according to Claim 10 wherein a table of the powers of said **Z**'s secret key **Cz** is prepared.